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1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we extend our results from [17] and [18] to a different 
economic model. In [17] and [18] our building unit was the individual 
agent and consequently the appropriate mathematical tools were mul- 
tifunctions, their sets of integrable selectors, and their integrals in the sense 
of Aumann. Here we change our approach and following Vind [23] we 
consider coalitions as the prime ingredient in our model. In this case, the 
natural analytical tool to work with are multimeasures (set valued 
measures). 
A central problem in economics is the characterization of efficient 
programs of resource allocation by a price system and the use of a price 
mechanism to attain such an allocation in economies where decision mak- 
ing is decentralized. Previous work on this problem was done by Majum- 
dar [15], Peleg [19], and Radner [20], but their models were quite 
restrictive (one agent models) and their assumptions were quite strict from 
a mathematical point of view. In [17] and [18] we provided a more 
general and natural framework to study those issues and through the use of 
nonsmooth analysis we overcame the limitations of the previous models 
and proved several new results. With this work we conclude this effort by 
addressing those problems from the viewpoint of coalitions. 
In the next section we present our model and the mathematical tools 
that we will use to analyze it. In Section 5 we examine the properties of 
efficient and optimal programs. Finally, in Section 4 we bring prices into 
the picture to decentralize the process and we study in detail the properties 
of the corresponding price efficient programs. Some of the results obtained 
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in Sections 3 and 4 are interesting as general results about multimeasures. 
So our model gives us the opportunity to make some contributions in the 
pure mathematical rea of multimeasures. 
2. DEFINITIONS 
First let us recall a few things about multimeasures that we will need in 
the sequel. 
Let (g2, 27) be a measurable space and X a Banach space. A mul- 
timeasure is a map M: 27 ~ 2Xk{~b } which satisfies a property of the follow- 
ing type: if A,~27 are mutually disjoint and A=U,>~A, ,  then 
M(A)--~=~ M(A,). Depending on the way we interpret his sum of sets 
we get different multimeasures. These are the following: 
DEFINITION 2.1. M( ')  is said to be a strict multimeasure (or simply a 
rnultimeasure) if M(~b)= {0} and M(.) is a-additive in the following sense: 
M(U,=I~ A, ) -~ °~-  ,=~ M(A , )  for every sequence of mutually disjoint 
elements of L~)~w-here for {K~}~I a sequence in 2 x the sum ~.~--1K. is 
~" ,,K~ ~. { x e X: x = Zn~= ~ x .  (unconditionally convergent) defined , s,, i,:,:: ,  . 
If M( ' )  takes nonempty, closed values we define 
DEFINITION 2.2. M( ')  is a normal multimeasure if M(~b)= {0} and 
for every {A.}.~>1--C-27 mutually disjoint l imN_~ h(M((_J2=l A.), 
• ZN=I M(An))=0 where h(. ,  ') is the Hausdorff metric on the closed 
subsets of X and -i- is the following addition of sets in X: Kx -i- K2 = 
KI + K2. 
Again assume that M( ' )  has nonempty and closed values. 
DEFINITION 2.3. M( ' )  is said to be a weak multimeasure if M(~b) = {0} 
and for all x*~ X* au(.)(x*) is a signed measure (here aK(" ) denotes the 
support function of the set K). 
If K~_X let [KL=supx~Kllxll .  For each Ae2;" define [MI(A)= 
~,,= ~ IM(A)I where the supremum is taken over all finite S-partitions sup N 
{A1" - 'A ,}  of A. If [M[(')<oo then M(')  is said to be of bounded 
variation. It is easy to see that [MI(') is a positive measure. So if M(-) is of 
bounded variation IM[(A)< oo for all A ~ S. Also in this case ~n~lXn is 
absolutely convergent for all x ,  6M(A , )  and all mutually disjoint An ~S 
when M(-) is a strict multimeasure. Suppose #(. ) is a measure on (O, X). 
We will say that M(.) is #-continuous if #(A)= 0 implies that M(A)= {0}. 
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We will use the following notations: 
Prlc)(X) = {K_~ X: nonempty, closed (convex)} 
Pwk(c)(X) = {K_~ X: nonempty, w-compact (convex) }
Pbf(c)(X) = (K  ~ X: nonempty, bounded, closed (convex)}. 
Now we will describe the basic concepts that we will examine in this 
paper. The mathematical objects describing our economy are the following: 
A finite (nonatomic) measure space (t2, 27, #), X a Banach space ordered 
by a nonempty, closed, convex pointed cone, X+ a strict set valued 
measure M: X~ 2x\{~b}, and a function u: X~ ~. Now we will give their 
economic meaning. First (f2, 27, p) is the measure space of agents 
(producers, consumers, or investors): £2 is the collection of agents, 27 is the 
family of all possible coalitions, and p(-) measures the relative size of the 
coalition. This idea of a continuum of agents was first introduced by 
Aumann [2] as a device that captures better the spirit of pure competition. 
We put the word nonatomic in parentheses because this assumption is not 
always necessary. When atoms are present we treat them as oligopolistic 
competitors. The space X is the commodity space. The- ~s~,rnrJfion that 
commodities are not finite in number agrees with ,n ic tl;~uations 
for economic theory: intertemporal equilibrium witl- "~>~:izon, a 
world of uncertainty with an infinite number of states or d,  !iation of 
commodities. The strict multimeasure M(-) gives the production (or con- 
sumption, investment) possibility set M(A)  for coalition A e27. By requir- 
ing additivity to hold we implicitly introduce assumptions on the nature of 
the conditions (technological and institutional) which determine the 
production (or consumption, investment) possibility set. The function u(.) 
is a utility function and so it will always be concave. Finally, an element 
x*~ X* = dual positive cone will be called a price system. 
At this point we are ready to introduce the concepts that will be central 
in this study. 
DEFINITION 2.4. A bundle x e X is said to be efficient for coalition A if 
and only if x ~ M(A)  and 
(x + X+ ) n M(A)  = (~ 
where X+ = X+\{0}. 
If we interpret the order induced on X by X+ as representing the 
preferences of the agents then a bundle x ~ X is efficient for A if and only if 
it is maximal in M(A)  for that preference relation. 
A measurable function f :  £2 ~ X will be an allocation and if for all 
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A e S ~Af(co)d#(co)~ M(A) we will say that f ( - )  is a feasible allocation. If 
we denote by SM the vector measure selectors of M(- ), we will call a vector 
measure m in SM a program (production, consumption, or investment 
program). We will say that such a program m(') is representable if there 
exists a feasible allocation f ( - )  s.t. m(A)= ~Af(o))d#(c0) for all A eS.  
DEFINITION 2.5. A bundle 2~M(A) is said to be optimal for coalition 
A if and only if u(y) <~ u(2) for all y E M(A). 
Finally, through the use of prices we can decentralize the process and 
introduce the following concept. 
DEFINITION 2.6. A bundle .;c~M(A) is price efficient for coalition A if 
and only if there exists x*~ J~* = X* \{0} s.t. aM(A)(X*)= (X*, 2). 
A bundle x~M(A) will be said to correspond to a program m()  if 
m(A)=x. Also x~M(A) will be said to be extremal if x~ext  M(A). 
3. EFFICIENT AND OPTIMAL BUNDLES 
In this section we examine the notions of efficiency and optimality 
introduced previously. 
For the first result assume that X is a separable Asplund space. Note 
that w* denotes the weak * topology on X*. 
THEOREM 3.1. 
variation which 
coalition A then 
If M: Y, ~ Pw'kc(X*) is a strict multimeasure of bounded 
is #-continuous and y is an extremal, efficient bundle for 
y corresponds toa representable program. 
Proof. Since X is an Asplund space we know (see Giles [10]) that 
M(A) = c--6-fi-q w* ext M(A) =~"6-n-VW*(w * exp M(A)) (where w* exp M(A) 
denotes the w* exposed points of M(A)). From the Krein Milman theorem 
we get that w* exp M(A) w" ~ ext M(A). At this point recall that since X is 
separable (M(A),w*) is metrizable (see Dunford and Schwartz 
[9, Theorem 1, p. 426]). So we can find {Yn }~> 1 -~ w* exp M(A) for which 
we have y, ~w* y. From Proposition 2.1 of Hiai [-12] we know that we can 
find m~6SM s.t. m,(A)=y,, n>~l. Consider {m~},~>l as a sequence in 
1-[A~zM(A), By Tychonoffs theorem this last set is w*-compact. So 
{mn}n>~l has a cluster point m. Clearly m(A)=y. We need to show that 
m(-) is in fact a vector measure. To see that let no be such that for N>~no 
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~-~.i~=NIM(Ai)I<e where {A~}~=I are mutually disjoint Z-sets and 
A = 0~=1A~. Then for all n~> 1 and for all N>~no we have that 
m,(A) -~i=l m,(A~) = N~ +e= c  1 m,(Ae) <~ 
m(A) -  ~ m(Ai) <e 
i=1  
which shows that m( ' )  is indeed a vector measure. Also for all B eZ 
m(B) e M(B), i.e., m ~ SM. Thus m(-) is of bounded variation and #-con- 
tinuous, Recalling that since X is Asplund, X* has the Radon-Nikodym 
property (R.N.P.), so we find f ( ,  ) e L~x,(O) s.t_ m(A) = ~Af(o~) d#(o~) for all 
A e S. So indeed x corresponds to a representable program. Q.E.D. 
The next result tells us that for any finite family of mutually disjoint 
coalitions, we can find a program assigning to each one of them an efficient 
bundle. By E(A) we will denote the set of efficient bundles for coalition A. 
Now X is any Banach space. 
THEOREM 3.2. I f  M: Z-~ Pr~(X) is a strict set valued measure with 
M(12) e Pwkc(X) and {Ai}7_ 1 is a family of mutually disjoint coalitions with 
E(Ai) # (3for all i = l " -n  then we can find a program m s.t. m(Ai) e E(Ai), 
i= l . . .n .  
Proof Let xeeE(Ai), i= l "n .  From Theorem 2.3 of Hiai [12] we 
know that there exist mieSM s.t. mi(A~)=xe, i= l " -n.  Let A=07=IA~ 
and consider m = ZAc me + ~,'= 1 ZAi me (where for B ~ Z (xBm)(") denotes 
the vector measure defined by (xBm)(C)=m(Cc~B) for all CeZ) .  We 
claim that m e S M. To see that let B e S. Then we have 
m(B) = (XAcml)(B) + ~ (x~im~)(B) 
i=1  
=mi(B~AC)+ ~ m~(B~Ai)e i (Bc~AC)+ ~ M(B~Ai)  
i=1  i=1 
= M(B c~ A ~) + M (B c~ A~) 
i 1 
= M(B c~ AC) + M(B c~ A) 
= M(B). 
Since B ~ X we conclude that m e SM. Finally, note that for all i = 1 --. n 
m(A3 = mg(A~) =x~ e E(A3. Q.E.D. 
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A natural question to ask concerning optimal bundles is whether they 
can be realized by a program, i.e., there exists m ~ SM s_t. for all coalitions 
A m(A) is optimal in M(A). This problem is solved in the next theorem, 
which in fact tells us more, namely, that there exists a price system which 
generates for each coalition a profit equal to its maximal utility. Again X is 
any Banach space. 
THEOREM 3.3. I f  M: X~ Pwkc(X) is a strict set valued measure of 
bounded variation and the utility function u: X~ • is continuous, linear 
increasing, and also u(. ) v~ 0 then there exists a program m and a price system 
x* ~ X* s.t. for all A ~ S m( A ) is optimal in M ( A ) and ~r Mc m( X* ) = u( m( A ) ). 
Proof Consider the set valued set function defined by 
R(A)= {xeM(A) :  u(X)=yeM(A)sup (y)}. 
We claim that R(-) is a normal multimeasure. First we will show that 
R(') is additive. So let A~,A 2 be disjoint Z:-sets and let xER(A lwA2) .  
Then x e M(A1 u A2) and u(x)= supy~ M(AI~A2)u(y). Since M( )  is a strict 
multimeasure M(A1 k) A2) = M(A1) + M(A2). So x = xl + x2 where 
Xl ~M(A1) and x2 ~ M(A2). Because u(.) is additive we have that 
u(x)=u(x j )+u(x2)= sup u(y)= sup 
v ~ M(A I  u A2) Yl E M(AI)  
Y2 6 M(A2) 
= sup u(y l )+ sup u(y2) 
Yt c M(AI)  Y2~ M(A2) 
u(yl +Y2) 
~U(Xl)= sup u(yl) and u(x2)= sup 
Yl a M(AI)  Y2 ~ M(A2) 
~ x ~ R(A1) + R(A2)- 
u(y~) 
So we have that 
R(A1 w A2) ~_ R(AL) + R(A2). (1) 
On the other hand let x e R(A 1) + R(A 2) ~ x = xl + x2 where x 1 ~ R(A 1 ), 
x2 ~ R(A2) :=~ x ~ M(A 1 w A2), and 
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~(X)=~(X 1 +X2)=~(X l )+~(X2)  
= sup u(y l )+ sup u(y2)= sup ~U(y l )~-u(y2)  ] 
Yl c M(A 1 ) Y2 ~ M(A2) YI ~ M(A 1 ) 
Y2 ~ M(A2) 
= sup U(yl +Y2)  = sup  u(y). 
Yl ~ M(A1) y ~ M(A1 w A2) 
Y2 ~ M(A2) 
So xeR(A1 uA2). Thus we have 
R(A1) + R(A2) ~ R(AI u A2). (2) 
From (1) and (2) above we deduce that R(AlWA2)=R(A1)+R(A2),  
i.e., R(.) is additive. Also note that R(~b)= {0}. 
Next let {A, ),/>1 ~ X s.t. A, J. ~b. Since M( ' )  is a strict multimeasure with 
values in Pwkc(X), it is easy to check that it is also a normal multimeasure 
and then by Theorem 5.4 of Drewnowski [8] we have that M(A,) ~h {0) 
as n ~ ~.  So IM(A,)[ ~ 0 as n ~ ~.  But IR(A,)I ~< IM(A,)r. Thus we have 
that IR(A,)J ~0  as n--+ ~ ~R(A , )  ~h {0). Hence we deduce that R(-) is 
order continuous. A new appeal to Theorem 5.4 of Drewnowski [8] gives 
us that R(.) is a normal multimeasure. Then from Godet-Thobie [ 11 ] we 
know that SR ~ ~b. So let m ~ SR. For all A E S we have that u(y) <~ u(m(A)) 
for all y ~ M(A). If we set 
~M(m(Y) = 0 ify ~ M(A) 
= -~ i fy~M(A),  
then from convex analysis (see Rockafellar [22]) we know that 
0 ~ ~[u + $~t~A)](m(A)) 
0 ~ ~u(m(A)) +OSM(a)(rn(A)). 
Hence there exists x*e Ou(m(A)) s.t. -x*e  ~$~(A)(m(A)). From the first 
relation, since u(-) is linear, we have 
x* = u(.) and (x*, re(A)) = u(m(A)). (3) 
From the second we get that 
(x*,y-rn(A))<~O, y~M(A)  
=~ aM(re(x*) = (x*, re(A)). (4) 
From (3) and (4) we conclude that ~rM(A)(X*)=u(m(A)). Also since 
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x*=u( ' )  we have that (x*,z)=u(z)  for all zeX.  Let z=eeX+.  Then 
(x*, e) = u(e) >~ 0 since u(' ) is monotone increasing. Hence we deduce that 
x* ~ X*. Suppose x* = 0. Then 0 = u(-) a contradiction. Q.E.D. 
4. PRICE EFFICIENT BUNDLES 
In this section we examine the decentralized concept of price efficiency. 
We will start by comparing efficiency with price efficiency. Here X is any 
Banach space. 
PROPOSITION 4.1. I f  M: S ~ Pro(X) is a strict multimeasure and either (i) 
int M(A) # 0 for all A ~ S or (ii) int X+ # (~ then for any coalition A every 
efficient bundle is price efficient. 
Proof Let x zM(A)  be efficient. Then by definition we have that 
(x+f (+)nM(A)#O.  Both (i) and (ii) allow us to apply the weak 
separation theorem and get an x* ~X*\{O} s.t. OM(A)(X*)<~ (X*, X +e) 
0 ~< (x*, e) for all e E 2+.  Hence x* e 2* ,  i.e., it is a price system. Finally, 
note that (x*, x )= aM(A)(X*) which means that x is price efficient for A for 
the price system x*. Q.E.D. 
From this result we see that it will be nice to know what are the 
implications of the interiority assumption on M('). For that we need the 
following easy lemma. Assume that #(- ) is nonatomic, A e Z" with #(A) > 0 
and X is any separable Banach space. 
LEMMA. I f  K is a nonempty, closed subset of X and for all co ~ A 
F(co) = K 
then cl ~A F(co) d#(co) = #(A) c-g-fi-9 K. 
Proof We know that for all x* ~ X* we have 
~C'~AF(X*): f A G F(°°)(X;~) d#(('°)= f A OK(X*)d#(co) = f ~ a~-6~K(x*) cl#(co) 
= 14A) a~K(x* )  = ~r.c~l~-wvK(x*)- 
From Theorem 4.2 of Hiai and Umegaki [13] we know that 
cl ~A F(co) d#(co) is convex. So the above equalities imply that 
cl fA F(CO) dg(o~) = it(A) ~ K. Q.E.D. 
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For the next result we will assume that M( )  has an integral represen- 
tation by a multifunction F: f2 ~ Pro(X) which is integrably bounded, i.e., 
for all AeZM(A)=fAF(cn)dp(a)). For example, this is the case when 
M(  ) is of bounded variation, U-continuous with weakly compact values, X 
has the R.N.P., and X* is separable. This multifunction decentralizes the 
production (or consumption, investment) process by specifying the produc- 
tion (or consumption, investment) possibility set of each individual agent 
Using this integral representation we can have the following interesting 
necessary and sufficient condition for int M(A) ¢ ~b for all A e S. This result 
is also a useful and important result in the general theory of multifunctions 
and multimeasures. Here X* is separable. 
THEOREM 4.1. If everything is as above then int M(B) ¢ q~ for all B ~ X, 
B ~_ A p(B) > 0 if and only if int F(eg) # q~ pA-a.e. 
Proof The sufficiency part is just the corollary on p. 778 of Cornwall 
[4]. 
For the necessity part we work as follows. Let z eint M(A). Then 
z = ~A g(e)) dp(~o) where g s S~-- set of integrable selectors of F(co). Also 
there exists e > 0 
where B1 is the unit open ball in X. From the lemma we know 
eB~ = (e/p(A))cl ~A Bldp(o~). So we can write 
" IA I g(c° )+ p+A ) B, ] dP(°9) ~- f A F(co) dP(°9) 
B 
Similarly for any B ~ Z', B ___ A, p(B)> 0 we have that 
B c 
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Since #(B)~< #(A) we have that 
- 
B •(o)). 
So for all B e X, B _~ A, #(B)> 0 we have that 
~ ~B(~/~(~))(~(o~))(x*) <<. ai, e~o~ ~ (x*) 
" fBaB(~/~IA),(g(~))(x*) d~(o~) <~ f aF(~)(x*) dl-t(~O). 
Since this is true for all B ~ Z, B _~ A we have that 
a B(~/u(A))~g(o o))(x* ) ~< a r(~)(x* )/tA-a.e. 
and the exceptional null set is independent of x* since the 
functions are continuous. Thus we deduce that 
B(#~A))  (g(o~))~-F(o~) #a-a.e. 
=~ g(o~) ~ int F(o~) #A-a.e. 
=~int F(co) # ~b #A-a.e. 
support 
PE(A, x*) = {x ~ M(A ): a M(a)(X*) = (X*, X) }. 
The next theorem examines the properties of the set valued set function 
A ~ PE(A, x*). Again X is any Banach space. 
Q.E.D. 
Remark. The assumption that F( ' )  has convex values is crucial. 
Without it the result is not true, for example, F ( t )= {0, 1} for all 
te I= [0, 13. Then M(I)=~IF(t )dt= [0, 1]. 
Next we pass to the examination of the set of price efficient bundles. So 
let x* e X* (i.e., x* is a price system) and denote by PE(A, x*) the set of 
all x*-efficient bundles for coalition A, i_e., 
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THEOREM 4.2. I f  M: S, ~ Pwk(X) & a strict set valued measure which is 
p-continuous then for all price systems x* El(* A ~ PE(A, x*) is a normal 
multimeasure. 
Proof First we will show that PE(., x*) is additive. So let A1, A2 e S 
s.t. AlnA2=(9  and A=AauA 2. Let xePE(A,x*) .  Then by definition 
x~M(A1uA2)  = M(A1)+M(A2)~x=x~+x2 with xlEM(A1), 
x2 e M(A2). Also we have 
aM(A)(X* ) : aM(AI ~ A2)(X*):  (X :~, X )= (X*, X 1 -~ X2) 
aM~A,~(X*) + aM~A21(X*) = (X*, Xl) + (X*, x2)- 
Since we always have that (X*,Xl)<<,aM(A,)(X*) and (x*,x2)<~ 
aMI~:)(X*) we deduce that equality holds in both cases. So we have that 
xa ~ PE(A1, x*) and x 2 ~ PE(A2, x*) ~ PE(A, x*) = PE(AI w A2, x*) ~_ 
PE(A~, x*)+ PE(A2, x*). In a similar way we can show that the opposite 
inclusion also holds. So PE(-, x*) is additive. 
Next we will show that PE(-,x*) is order continuous. So let 
{A,)~>~lC_S s.t. A~$¢. Note that M(. )  being a strict multimeasure of 
bounded variation with values in Pwk(X) it is also a normal multimeasure. 
Then ~-6-fiVM(-) is a normal multimeasure too. Use the RadstrSm 
embedding Theorem [211 to view conv M( ' )  as a a-additive Banach 
valued measure. Since by hypothesis eonv M(-)  vanishes at sets of p- 
measure zero, using Pettis' theorem (see Diestel and Uhl [7, p. 10]) we 
have that h(c--6-ffq M(A~), {0}) ~ 0 as n ~ or. But recall that h('C6-6V M(A~), 
{O})=h(M(A,,), {0}). So h(M(A,), {0})~0~ [M(A,)[ ~0 as n ~ ~ and 
since clearly fPE(A,, x*)] ~ [M(A,)I we also have that IPE(A,, x*)l ~ 0 as 
n ~ ~.  Then from Drewnowski [8] we deduce that PE(', x*) is a normal 
multimeasure. Finally, it is easy to see that for all A e X, PE(A, x* )e  Pr(X). 
Q.E.D. 
This result has an interesting consequence, namely, that there exists a 
program which assigns to each coalition a bundle that is price efficient for 
the same price system. Assume X is separable. 
THEOREM 4.3. I f  M: S, --+ Pwkc(X) k a strict multimeasure and 
PE(-, x* ) v~ ¢ then there exists a program m s.t. m( A ) ~ PE( A, x* ) for all 
coalitions A. 
Proof This follows directly from Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 1 (p. 968) 
of Coste [5]. Q.E.D. 
Next we will determine what we can say about the subcoalitions of A 
when we are given an extremal, price efficient bundle for A, Again X is any 
Banach space. 
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PROPOSITION 4.2. I f  M: 22 ~ Pwkc(X) is a strict set valued measure x e X 
is an extremal, x*-efficient bundle for A (x* e X* ) and B is any subcoalition 
of A (i.e., BeS ,  B~_A) then x can be uniquely decomposed into xl + x z 
where x I is an extremal, x*-efficient bundle for B and x2 is an extremal, 
x*-effieient bundle for A\B. 
Proof Consider the disjoint decomposition A = (A \B)u  B. From the 
additivity of M(-) we have that M(A)=M(A\B)+M(B) .  Because 
x~ext  M(A)  using Theorem 1 (p. 5) of Kluvanek and Knowles [-14] we 
know that there exist unique x~ ~extM(B)  and x2eextM(A\B)  s.t. 
x=x 1 --~x 2. Then we have (x*, Xl +X2)=OM(~)(X*) = aMain(X*)+ 
aMiA\m(x*) =~ (x*, xl) = aM(B)(x*) and (x*, x2) = aM(A\m(X*). Q.E.D. 
For the next result we assume that M: Z--* Pwk~(JO has an integral 
representation M(A)=~AF(e))d#(co) where F :O~Pr~(X  ) is integrably 
bounded• In this case a measurable map f :  g2 --, X s.t. f(o)) s F(co) #A-a.e, is 
said to be an allocation for coalition A e 22. If x* ~ X*+ we will say that such 
an allocation is x*-efficient for A if and only if asiA(x*)= (x* , f ) .  Finally, 
we will say that f ( . )  is extremal if and only if f ( . )eext  S~ (here F A 
denotes the restriction of F( ' )  on A and S~ its L~-selectors). Assume that 
X is a separable Banach space. 
PROPOSITION 4.3. For every coalition A ~ Z there is an x*-efficient bun- 
dle that is the integral of an extremal x*-efficient allocation. 
Proof From Bauer's maximum principle we know that there exists 
x e ext M(A)  s.t. aM(A)(X* ) = (X*, X). Note that ext M(A) 
Ia ext F(e)) d#(co) and ext F( ' )  has a X x B(X)-measurable graph. So we can 
find f ( - )  e S_lxtpA s.t. x = Iaf(o~) dp(co). But from Benamara [3] we know 
that S~xtvA = ext S~a. So f ( - )  is extremal for A. Furthermore we have 
as l (X* )= sup (x* ,g )= sup ~x*,jAg(m)d~t(o~))= sup (x*,y) 
= (x* , f ) .  
Thus we conclude that f ( ' )  is x*-efficient. Q.E.D. 
The next two results examine the topological properties of the set of 
price efficient bundles. For the first assume that J( is any Banach space and 
re(X*, X) indicates the Mackey topology on X* compatible with the dual 
pair (X*, X). 
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PROPOSITION 4.4. I f  M: S -~ P~k~(X) is a strict multimeasure then for all 
coalitions A and all prices systems x* ~ X* we have that PE(A, x*) is non- 
empty, w-compact, and convex. 
Proof Since aM<m() is sublinear, for all x*EX*  we have, staying in 
the dual pair (X*, X), 
&~,(~(x*) = {x e ~, (~ j(0): a~,(~)(x*) = (x*, x) }. 
Note that XaOaM(~)(O)~:~(X*,X)<~aMtA)(X*) for all x*aX*  
xem(A) .  Thus we have Oa~<m(x* ) = {xEM(A):  aM(A)(X*)= (X*, X)} = 
PE(A, x*). But since M(- ) takes values in Pwk~(X), for all A ~ Z aM(A) (") is 
m(X*,X)-continuous. So from convex analysis we know that 
OaM(A)(x*) = PE(A, x*)= nonempty, w-compact, convex for all A a Z and 
all x* e Z , .  Q_E.D. 
The second topological result determines the nature of the set of all price 
efficient bundles over all coalitions for a given price system x*E ) ( * .  The 
result is also interesting as a general result about multimeasures, since it is 
essentially a result about the range of a multimeasure. It generalizes 
Proposition 2.2. of Hiai [12]. 
THEOREM 4.4. I f  M: X-~ Pwk(X) is a strict multimeasure then the set of 
all x*-efficient bundles over all coalitions is relatively w-compact, i.e., 
UA~X PE(A, x*) w is w-compact. 
Proof We saw in Theorem 4.2 that PE(. ,x*)  is a normal mul- 
timeasure. To economize in the notation call it N('). Then it is easy to see 
that N( )  is a weak multimeasure, i.e., for all z*e X* aN(.~(Z*) is a signed 
measure on (D, Z'). From Hahn's decomposition theorem we can find dis- 
joint X-sets D+, f2 , s.t. f2---(2+ uD_  and aM~.)(x*) is positive on D+ 
and negative on f2 . Let R;v be the range of N(-), i.e., R~¢= L)A~x N(A)_ 
Then we have 
o Ru(z* ) = sup O N(A)(Z* ) = sup a u~ A ~o+ )(z* ). 
AE,~ A~Z 
Note that N(A n D + ) + N(A c n £2 + ) = N(O + ). So 
(T N(A ~ U2 + ) ( ' ) -~-  ~ N(AC ~ f2 + ) ( ' )  = ~ N(~+ ) ( ' )  
and since all quantities involved are positive we have that for all A c S 
ON~A~a+)("  <~ ON(a+)(" ). Using that we get 
~RN(Z*) = ou~o÷~(z*). 
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But N(O + ) • ewk(X). So there exists 2 • N(O + ) ___ Ru  s.t. 
cr~,,~+)(z*) = (z*, 2). 
Recall that z*•X*  was arbitrary. So invoking the James theorem we 
conclude that w-cl R N is W-compact. Q.E.D. 
The last two results are stability results concerning the set of price 
efficient bundles for a coalition A. 
We will say that a pair [x*, x ]  • J(* x X is a price efficient pair for M(- ) 
if and only if there is a coalition A s.t. x • PE(A, x*). 
If Kn, K are nonempty subsets of X, we say that K, ~K- -MK as n--* oo if 
and only if w-lim sup, ~ ~ K, = K = s-lira inf~ ~ ~ K, where w-lira sup K,  = 
{x e X: x = w-limk ~ ~ x,  k, x ,  k ~ K,k} and s-lim inf, ~ oo K, = {x • X: x = 
s-lira, ~ oo x, ,  x ,•K ,} .  If {f , , f}  c_ ~x are proper we say that f ,  ~f i f  and 
only if epif,, ~K-M ep i f  as n --* oo. If the functions are defined on X* we 
call this mode of convergence z*-convergence (for details we refer to 
Attouch [1]  and Mosco 1-16]. 
For the next result assume that X is a Hilbert space_ 
PROPOSITION 4.5. I f  M~, M: Y. ~ Pr¢(X) are strict multimeasures s.t. for 
all A•X  M~(A)--*K-M M(A) as n--* o0 then for any coalition A and any 
price efficient pair Ix*, x ]  for A and M(  ), we can find again for A price 
* ~Sx*  and xn ~Sx  as n--* oo. efficient pairs Ix*, x , l  for M, (  ) s.t. x,  
Proof Fix A•S .  Because M,(A) - -*K-MM(A)  as n~oo,  from 
Theorem 3.1 of Mosco [16],  we get that aM.(A ) ~*  aM(A) as n ~ oo. Recall 
that for all x* • X* and n >/1 
PE,(A, x*) = gaM,(a)(x* ) and PE(A ,  x :~ ) = O(TM(A)(X* ). 
From Attouch [1]  we know that 
Gr O~Mn(A ) K--M , Gr 00"M(A) 
as n ~ oo (where Gr • denotes the graph of the multifunction over con- 
sideration). Since Ix*, x ]  •Gr  Oam(A)('), from the above fact we deduce 
that there exist Ix* ,  x , ]  • Gr 0aM,(AI(" ) s.t. 
I x* ,  x , ]  s , [-x*, x ]  as n --* oo 
x* ~x*  and xn " ,x  asn- - - ,~ .  Q.E.D. 
For the second stability result assume that X is a reflexive Banach space. 
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PROPOSITION 4.6. / f  M: Z '~ Pwk¢(X) is a strict set valued measure 
and {x* ,x*} ,>. l~X*  s.t. x*~Sx * then for any coalition A 
w-lira sup,  ~ ~ PE(A, x*) ~_ PE(A, x*). 
Proof Again we use the fact that PE(A, X*)=&rM(A)(X* ) for any 
coalition A and any x*e  X*.  But from convex analysis we know that the 
subdifferential multifunction x* --* 0a~t(A)(x*) is u.s.c, when X* is endowed 
with the Mackey topology re(X*, X) and X is endowed with the weak 
topology w(X, X*). Since X is reflexive we have that m(X*, X)= strong 
(norm) topology on X*. Then from Delahaye and Denel [6] we get that if 
c x* ~s  x* then w-lira supn ~ o~ O0"M(A)(Xn ) -- ~GM(A)(X*) ~w- l im sup ,_  o~ 
PE(A, x* ) ~_ PE(A, x* ). Q.E.D. 
Remark. The reader probably noticed that some of the results presen- 
ted in this paper are still true weaker assumptions on M(.) (e.g., 
additivity). However, for the sake of clarity and uniformity of the 
exposition we decided to assume throughout the whole paper that M(.) is 
a strict multimeasure. After all this hypothesis is compatible with the 
economics literature (see Vind 1-23]). 
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